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DEATH BY RECKLESS DESIGN: THE NEED FOR




When traveling over a skywalk,' or driving across a bridge, most people do
not expect the structure to collapse at any moment. This confidence comes
from the great faith the public places in the abilities of engineers3 and other
design professionals. In order to protect that faith and safeguard the public,
states require those engaged in the engineering profession to obtain certain
licenses. When an engineer acts in a way that consciously deviates from the
duties imposed on him through these licensing requirements, and someone dies
as a result, criminal liability must attach to his actions.
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S.
Civil Engineering, 2004, Bucknell University. The author would like to thank Professor
Elizabeth G. Porter for her guidance and challenging commentary, the staff of the Catholic
University Law Review for their tireless work and suggestions, and his family for their love and
support. Finally, the author would like to thank his wife Rebecca for her never-ending positivity,
love, and support.
1. See Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof'l Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d
524, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (describing the collapse of two hotel walkways).
2. See Monica Davey, At Bridge Site, Search of River Moves Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2007, at AI (describing the search for missing individuals following the "collapse of the most
heavily traversed bridge in Minnesota").
3. The term engineer is essentially interchangeable with the word architect in most courts,
because the requirements and duties are similar for each. Jeff Sobel, Comment, Architect Tort
Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1361, 1361 n.3 (1967); see
also Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1075,
1075 n.1 (1979).
4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-11-2(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7202
(McKinney 2001). When members do not meet the standards set by the profession those
members "lower[] the reputation and quality of the entire profession." BRIAN M. SAMUELS,
CONSTRUCTION LAW 128-29 (1996).
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In recent years, construction projects have become increasingly complex.
5
Consequently, criminal statutes must be updated to prevent those in the design
industry from ignoring their duties and allowing flawed designs to enter public
use. When a design fails, the failure can result in massive loss of life.6 As
5. See, e.g., NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT: CEILING
COLLAPSE IN THE INTERSTATE 90 CONNECTOR TUNNEL BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 15 (2007),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007iHAR0702.pdf [hereinafter NTSB] (describing a
project in Boston called the "Big Dig"). The Boston project known as the "Big Dig" undertook
the design and construction of the replacement of the "'Central Artery' through Boston." Id. The
intricacies in this project were largely based on the necessity to minimize its effect on the public.
Id. The construction required that the existing highway remain open for public use, while the
replacement was being constructed beneath it underground. Id. The construction of this
underground highway also required crossing a subway line as well as tunneling under a number
of existing railroad tracks, all of which had to be done without causing disruption to any of these
services. Id.
Beyond minimizing the effect on the public, new construction can pose unique challenges as
physical limits are stretched by the human mind. Taipei 101 is a recently constructed high rise
tower located in Taiwan that reaches 101 stories into the sky. Chris Hogg, Taipei 101: A View
From the Top, BBC NEWS, Dec. 31, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4137865.stm.
The building has been classified as the tallest building in the world. Id. Because Taipei 101
stands in one of the world's most active earthquake zones, special design requirements were
needed to achieve this special status. Id. To address this situation, the building's designers
supported the building with "380 concrete piles, each sunk into the soil to a depth of 80[ meters]"
and installed a "606 metric tonne[] .. . 'damper' designed to sway from side to side, to reduce the
movement if the tower is hit by high winds." Id. Beyond earthquake protection, this combination
of safety precautions will also help to provide a 40% reduction to the effects of a typhoon. Id.
Taipei 101 is just one example where the physical limits of design are stretched to allow human
creativity and ingenuity to be attained.
Another example of engineering ingenuity is the Grand Canyon Skywalk. The Skywalk is a
seventy-foot-long glass-bottomed walkway that cantilevers over the Grand Canyon. Sam Lubell,
Let's Take a Skywalk: The Grand Canyon Skywalk is Breathtaking-But Costly, BUSINESSWEEK,
Apr. 16, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/apr2007/
id20070416_894938.htm. The skywalk is "suspended 4000 feet above the [Canyon bottom]."
Grand Canyon Skywalk, http://destinationgrandcanyon.com/skywalk.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2009). To provide maximum safety to the public in its use of the walkway, it was designed to
support "more tha[n] 71 million pounds ... [and] sustain winds in excess of 100 miles per hour
from 8 different directions, as well as an 8.0 magnitude earthquake within 50 miles." Id.
In addition to creating designs that protect structures from the environment, builders are also
beginning to implement environmentally friendly designs. See, e.g., David Littlejohn, The State
of Mayne s New Federal Office Building, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 15, 2007, at D7.
Beyond designs that merely limit a building's consumption of resources, some designs have gone
as far as having the building itself made from recycled materials. See id. As ecological concerns
continue to grow, the demand on engineering design will continue to grow as well.
6. See Duncan, 744 S.W.2d at 527 (describing the falling of walkways resulting in the
death of more than one hundred people and the injury of many more).
In August 2007, the "most heavily traversed bridge in Minnesota" collapsed, crashing into the
river below. See Davey, supra note 2. The collapse took the lives of thirteen people and injured
one hundred more. Associated Press, NTSB: Minneapolis Bridge that Collapsed had Design
Flaw, CNN.COM, Jan. 15, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008iUS/01/15/bridge.collapse.ap/#cnn
STCText. Although there was wide speculation that the forty-year-old bridge collapsed as a
result of a maintenance issue, the National Transportation Safety Board released an interim report
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projects become more complex, it becomes more important for design
engineers to constantly consider the "safety, health and welfare of the public."
7
Deterrence is best achieved by imposing criminal liability on the individual
and the company whose acts or omissions created the problem.8 Criminal
liability also puts others in the field on notice as to the type of conduct that will
lead to penalties. 9 The deterrent effect created by criminal laws with high
penalties is not attainable through civil sanctions alone.
10
The statutory wording varies from state to state, but the general standard is
that a person will be held responsible for involuntary manslaughter when his
stating that the collapse was a result of a design error in the original plans. Matthew L. Wald,
Controversy Dogs Inquiry on Bridge Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at A13.
In an accident in Boston, Massachusetts, 8000 tons of construction material collapsed, killing
four construction workers and injuring twenty others. JACOB FELD & KENNETH L. CARPER,
CONSTRUCTION FAILURE 422 (2d ed. 1997). During the subsequent investigation into the cause
of the collapse, it was determined that "[n]umerous design and construction deficiencies ...
including violations of a number of standards" played a role. Id.
In October 2003, five levels of a ten-story parking garage being built at the Tropicana Casino
and Resort in Atlantic City, New Jersey, collapsed. Robert D. McFadden, 3 Dead and 20 Hurt in
Collapse at Atlantic City Construction Site, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at B 1. The collapse
killed four people and injured twenty others. Eric Lipton, Changes in Design Preceded Collapse
of Casino Garage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at 33. The collapse was attributed to faulty
installation and changes in the approved design to save both money and time in the construction.
Id. Subsequent analysis showed that the design changes significantly weakened the strength of
the structure. Id. This determination only reinforced concerns that workers raised during
construction, showing that both the contractors and inspecting engineers had warning of potential
problems. See Eric Lipton, Workers Sensed Danger Before Collapse of Parking Garage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 33.
Even in the event that death does not occur, it is sometimes a result of luck rather than safety
in the design. In July 1983, the entire roof of a Magic Mart store collapsed injuring fifty-two
people. FELD & CARPER, supra, at 197. The reason no one was killed was "attributed to the
strength of the merchandise shelving, which proved to have more integrity than the building's
structure ... [holding] the collapsed roof ... and protect[ing] the people . I..." d  In another
example, when the roof of the Hartford Civic Center suddenly collapsed, no one died or was
injured. Id. at 198. Had the accident occurred six hours earlier when 5000 spectators were
attending a basketball game, the death toll could have been enormous. See id.
The occurrence of these types of events leaves the public looking at all structures and
wondering "what if?" See Davey, supra note 2 (discussing the August 2007 collapse of the 1-35
West bridge in Minneapolis).
7. NAT'L SOC'Y OF PROF'L ENG'RS, NSPE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS, § I(1),
http://www.nspe.org/Ethics/CodeofEthics/Code-2007-July.pdf [hereinafter NSPE] (describing
the first fundamental cannon of professional engineering ethics).
8. See Douglas S. Anderson, Corporate Homicide: The Stark Realities ofArtificial Beings
and Legal Fictions, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 367, 416 (1981) (explaining that the attachment of criminal
liability generally provides for the imposition of a larger penalty as well as the stigmatization of
those convicted).
9. See id. (explaining that attaching the stigma of criminal liability can advertise to others
the possible consequences of their actions).
10. See id. at 378 (acknowledging that certain types of wrongdoing cannot be deterred by
civil liability and, without attaching criminal liability, that wrongdoing will likely recur).
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act or omission shows a disregard or indifference for human life.1" The
question then becomes: what type of conduct will meet this standard? When
all of the applicable design standards are met and an accident nonetheless
occurs, liability should not apply. 12 However, when there is a high probability
of harm,1 3 and no preventative or remedial measures are taken, liability must
apply.
Under current statutes, the penalty for being found liable for a death differs
based on who committed the crime. Whereas an individual found liable would
likely face jail time, 14 a corporation found liable for the same offense would
only be subject to a small fine. 15 This calls into question whether current
statutes are sufficient as drafted.
A certain level of personal liability is one of the biggest reasons why people
choose one business structure over another.16  The limited liability that a
corporation provides may prevent an individual shareholder from being held
criminally liable, but it does not prevent the attachment of criminal liability to
the corporation.' 7 In order to deal with today's business structures, criminal
statutes must be amended to properly punish those who implement substandard
designs and to deter others from attempting to do so.
This Comment begins by examining the areas of engineering that provide
opportunity for the creation of liability and the issues that prevent civil liability
alone from being an adequate deterrent. It then examines how liability can
attach to both the engineer and his company. Next, this Comment examines
current manslaughter statutes from various jurisdictions and the possible
penalties that may be imposed upon conviction. This Comment then discusses
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6 (LexisNexis 2005); id. § 13A-5-11 (LexisNexis Supp.
2007); id. § 13A-6-3 (LexisNexis 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 193 (West Supp. 2008); id § 672
(West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205 (2007); id.
§ 4208; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082 (West Supp. 2008); id. § 775.083 (West 2005); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-3 (2008); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.011
(West Supp. 2008); id. § 560.011 (West 1999); id. § 560.021; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00
(McKinney Supp. 2008); id. § 80.00 (McKinney 2004); id. § 80.10; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50
(West 2005).
12. See People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that
when it was not possible to foresee the harm or take any measures to prevent it, no criminal
liability may attach).
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that a high probability of harm
occurs through a reckless act or an omission that creates "a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
harm to others and [is done] by a conscious (and sometimes deliberate) disregard for or
indifference to that risk").
14. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a)(1) (describing the allowable prison sentence for
an involuntary manslaughter conviction as up to twelve months).
15. See, e.g., id. (noting that the fine for involuntary manslaughter is $1000).
16. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. FREER, MICHAEL J. ROBERTS & GEORGE B.
SHEPHERD, BUSINESS STRUCTURES 148 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining that the risk to corporate
owners is normally limited to what they paid for their shares of their stock).
17. See infra Part I.C.2.
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what type of act creates criminal liability and who should be held responsible
for these acts. It then suggests a criminal statute that would maximize
deterrence. Finally, this Comment discusses the danger of the continuing use
of current statutes and their applicable punishments in this context.
I. ISSUES AFFECTING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR ENGINEERS AND
ENGINEERING CORPORATIONS
A. Professional Roles and Requirements Provide Opportunities for Liability
Engineers and design professionals are involved in numerous stages of the
construction process. 8  The first stage of any construction project is the
creation of design plans. 19 The majority of claims against engineers arise from
20errors in the work performed during this first stage. On completion of the
design, documents are provided to individuals or groups who want to bid on
the building contract.2 1 The bidding process is typically conducted in a short
period of time and does not allow for thorough review of the plans. 22 This
23
forces bidders to rely on the information provided. As a result, the engineer
owes any person receiving the bid documents a duty of care.
24
After the design and bidding period, an engineer's services may be retained
to oversee the actual building phase. 25 Further services may include ensuring
compliance with the design plans or authorizing changes. One example of
these services is the review and approval of shop drawings.2 7 Review of plan
compliance may also create liability.28 This liability would flow from any
authorization of deviation from the approved plans. However, the act of
allowing the change is not what creates liability; the liability instead ensues
18. See H. LESLIE SIMMONS, CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES, MATERIALS, AND METHODS 2
(7th ed. 2001).
19. Id.
20. Sobel, supra note 3, at 1362.
21. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 10 (explaining that bidding documents are design plans
used by the contractors who plan to bid on the job to determine the amount of money it will cost
them to construct the project).
22. SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 44.
23. Id.
24. See id. (explaining that undertaking a thorough design review for accuracy would force
bidders to duplicate the work already done and add a great deal of cost).
25. SIMMONS, supra note 18, at 11.
26. Id.
27. See Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof'l Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d
524, 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). Shop drawings are submitted to "provide assurance for the owner
that the fabricator is conforming to the contract and that any engineering work conforms to
acceptable standards." Id. at 530.
28. See Potter v. Gilbert, 115 N.Y.S. 425, 427 (App. Div. 1909), affid, 90 N.E. 1165 (N.Y.
1909).
29. See id.
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when the change is approved but fails to conform to either the approved plan
or an acceptable substitute design.
30
B. Issues Preventing Civil Remedies from Achieving Optimal Deterrence
Some commentators argue that a civil fine can act as a sufficient deterrent.
31
However, these commentators fail to consider the effects that insurance 32 and
statutes of repose 33 have on individuals and the companies for which they
work.
1. Insurance and Its Ability to Remove the Sting of Civil Sanctions
Engineering design is a business that is "under constant pressure to prepare
specifications and drawings quickly."34 The nature of the business creates the
opportunity for liabilit. 35 Very few engineers can afford to pay for successful
claims against them. Consequently, many obtain insurance to protect
themselves from potential financial ruin.37  Policies typically range from
$100,000 of minimum coverage to as much as $25,000,000 or more.38 Beyond
indemnifying any claim brought against the engineer, as part of the policy, the
insurance company takes on the duty to defend the engineer in the suit.
39
There are many forms of insurance available to an engineer, but the policies
are usually for either liability or property insurance. 40 A basic policy will have
limitations and exclusions to coverage.4' However, the parties can agree to
extend coverage with a more comprehensive policy.42 It may not be one policy
30. See, e.g., Duncan, 744 S.W.2d at 530 (discussing how an approved change of plans
resulted in liability).
31. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1370 (1979) [hereinafter Developments in
the Law] (arguing that if the amount of the fine is large enough it will provide the appropriate
level of deterrence).
32. See infra Part I.B. I.
33. See infra Part I.B.2.
34. FRANK J. BALTZ, SELECTING A PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY FOR
DESIGN PROFESSIONALS 1 (1984).
35. See id.
36. SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 77.
37. See id.
38. BALTZ, supra note 34, at 34.
39. SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 78; see also BALTZ, supra note 34, at 27.
40. SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 76. Liability insurance is obtained for protection from third-
party claims that are based on the engineer's "errors or omissions." Id. As expected, property
insurance covers any damage that may occur to the property. Id.
41. See BALTZ, supra note 34, at 7-8. Typical exclusions include any "intentional violation
of federal, state or local law." Id. at 8.
42. See id. at 8. In the case of claims such as professional malpractice, the insurance
company's answer to increased levels of coverage has been to seek higher premiums from the
insured. See Peter J. Neeson, The Current Status of Professional Architects' and Engineers'
Malpractice Liability Insurance, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 39, 42 (1978).
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that creates maximum coverage, but rather the combination of numerous
policies that will provide the best protection for the engineer.4 3
Similarly, the scope of coverage varies from policy to policy, and the
duration of coverage can differ as well. 44 The two main types of policies are
"claims-made" and "occurrence" policies.45 A "claims-made" policy is one
that covers only those claims made while the policy is current.46  An
"occurrence" policy covers claims caused by acts that occurred while the
policy was current, regardless of whether it is presently current.47  As the
majority of engineering policies are "claims-made, ' '48 many engineers maintain
policies for the jurisdictional statutory period following their retirement to
ensure continued protection from liability.
49
2. The Statutes of Repose and Their Role in Preventing Claims from Being
Filed
Claims generally have a set statutory period during which they must be filed
called the statute of limitations period.50  When injuries are the result of
construction or design errors, the corresponding claims may also have to
satisfy a statute of repose. 51 Even though the exact definition of a statute of
repose will vary based on the jurisdiction, the statute can largely be classified
as an "outer time limit" during which a claim must be filed.52
One of the key differences between a statute of limitations and a statute of
repose is the time when each begins to run. While the statute of limitations on
43. See BALTZ, supra note 34, at 35-36.





49. See id. During retirement, policy rates are generally much lower then the rates for
policies covering a working engineer. Id.
50. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions § 9 (2000).
51. See William H. Knapp & Byrum C. Lee, Jr., Application of Special Statutes of
Limitations Concerning Design and Construction, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J. 351, 352 (1979).
52. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 167 (5th ed.
1984). Some jurisdictions consider a statute of repose to be simply another name for a statute of
limitations. Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability
Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1981). Another theory is that a statute of
repose is a term to describe a larger grouping of statutes of limitations. Id. at 583. Still another
view finds that the difference between a statute of repose and a statute of limitations is when they
begin to run, with a statute of repose usually "begin[ning] to run at a time unrelated to the...
cause of action." Id. at 584. A statute of limitations, on the other hand, "begins to run when all
the elements of a cause of action have accrued." Id. at 584-85. There are multiple theories on
why these statutes were initiated. One theory is that they protect those defendants who would
suffer most from an indefinite statutory period, and the other is that they protect the groups that
have the most political muscle. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra, at 167.
Catholic University Law Review
a negligence claim may not begin to run until the harm has occurred,53 in that
time the statute of repose may have already expired, barring the claim.54 The
determination of when a statute of repose will begin to run is based on the
55language of the statute. The two most common starting points are when a
53. See McGovern, supra note 52, at 584-85.
54. See id; see also, e.g., Hale v. Depaoli, 192 P.2d 815, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)
(describing the eighteen-year period between house construction and the design error causing
harm), opinion vacated by 201 P.2d I (Cal. 1948); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822,
824-25 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (barring of a wrongful death claim based on an architect's failure
to design and specify safety precautions for hotel windows from which the decedent fell to her
death because claim was brought "more than ten years after... substantial completion"); Zapata
v. Bums, 542 A.2d 700, 702 (Conn. 1988) (explaining that multiple wrongful death claims
against the architectural design firm who designed and supervised the construction of a bridge
that collapsed were barred because the claims were brought "seven years after substantial
completion"); State v. Echeverri, 736 So. 2d 791, 791-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining
that wrongful death claims relating to errors in highway design against the architect responsible
were "barred by the [fifteen-year] statute of repose"); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2
of the Parish of St. Charles, 366 So. 2d 1381, 1384, 1388 (La. 1978) (holding that a ten-year
statute of repose barred a wrongful death claim for an engineer's failure to provide proper safety
precautions in the design); Reich v. Jesco, Inc., 526 So. 2d 550, 551 (Miss. 1988) (explaining that
a claim against the designer of a roof that collapsed was barred by the statute of repose as the
collapse happened twelve years after construction); Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821
S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. 1991) (noting that multiple wrongful death claims resulting from
architectural and engineering design of a highway exit ramp were barred by the statute of repose
because these injuries occurred more then twenty years after construction was completed); Lamb
v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868, 869-71 (N.C. 1983) (holding that a wrongful death
claim based on a failure to design adequate safety precautions that caused the decedent to fall out
of a hotel window to his death was barred against the designer by the statute of repose); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915, 916-17 (Okla. 1989) (explaining that a
claim against the designer for a ceiling collapse twenty years after construction was barred by the
statute of repose); Sobel, supra note 3, at 1378 & n.129 (referencing the California Supreme
Court's ruling on Hale when discussing that the damage from a design defect may take years to
occur). An example of the effect statutes of repose can have on statutes of limitations is the
following:
[lI]n a jurisdiction having a three-year tort statute of limitations as well as an architects'
and builders' statute of repose requiring all actions to be commenced within ten years
after completion of the improvement, a person injured in the sixth year after completion
is subject to the normal statute of limitations and has three years to file suit. On the
other hand, a person injured on the 364th day of the ninth year following completion of
the improvement has only one day within which to commence an action.
Gerald W. Heller, The District of Columbia's Architects' and Builders' Statute of Repose: Its
Application and Needfor Amendment, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 927 (1985).
55. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 12-310(a) (2001) (expressing that the statutory period begins to
run at the time of substantial completion); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (West 1999) (beginning
the statutory clock at the time of "written acceptance or actual occupancy or use, whichever
occurs first"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (2007) (starting the statutory clock at the time the
project is completed).
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project is either "substantially completed, ' '56 or when it has reached
"completion. 57
The length of the statutory period that begins from these starting points
varies based on the state. Some states have a period as short as four years,
58
while others provide for longer periods of up to ten years. 59 Even though these
time limitations are meant to prevent the ongoing possibility of a claim, limited
extensions do exist. Examples of such extensions are when the defect is latent
rather than patent, or when the event causing the claim occurs in one of the
final years of the statutory period.6' Additionally, some states do not apply a
statutory period for wrongful death claims. 62  This standard is far from the
majority, because a number of states clearly list wrongful death as a claim that
will be barred when the statutory period expires.
63
While statutes of repose may bar civil actions, criminal actions may still be
pursued after the statute has run.64 Criminal statutes of limitations generally
begin to run after every element of the crime has occurred. 65  Therefore,depending on the jurisdiction, a manslaughter action could be brought
56. D.C. CODE § 12-310(a)(l)(B). A project will be determined to be "substantially
completed when-(A) it is first used, or (B) it is first available for use after having been
completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement . . whichever
occurs first." Id. § 12-31 0(a)(2).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208(1). The term "'completion' means that degree of
completion at which the owner can utilize the improvement for the purpose for which it was
intended or when a completion certificate is executed, whichever is earlier." Id. § 27-2-208(4)(a).
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1(a) (West 2006).
59. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.097(1) (West Supp. 2007). Other jurisdictions impose
statutory periods in between four and ten years. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-104(1)(a)
(2007) (preventing claims being made "six years after the substantial completion"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-51(a) (2007) (preventing claims from being made "eight years after substantial
completion").
60. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1(a) (providing for a four-year statute of
limitations), with id. § 337.15(a) (providing a ten-year period for all latent defects). A deficiency
will be termed a "'latent deficiency' ... [when it] is not apparent by reasonable inspection." Id. §
337.15(b).
61. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-104(2) (explaining that when the action arises during
either of the last two years of the statutory period, the injured party has two years from the date of
the incident in which to bring a claim).
62. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (West 1999).
63. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-104(l)(c)(III); D.C. CODE § 12-310(a)(1)(A)(iii)
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-51 (a)(3).
64. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-51 (explaining that "[s]tatutes of limitation in civil
cases shall not run against the state"); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 32 (explaining that the
violation of an act allows for both a civil and criminal penalty, the prosecution of one does not bar
the other); D.C. CODE § 12-31 0(b)(4) (expressing that the statute of repose does not bar any
action brought by the government).
65. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
876 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that "[v]irtually all jurisdictions provide that the period of
limitation begins to run with the commission of the crime that is, when every element in the
statutory definition of the offense has occurred").
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anywhere from two 6 6 to five67 years after the death of the victim, regardless of
whether the statute of repose had expired.
3. The Effect of Criminal Liability on the Filing of Civil Actions
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution holds that no person
shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb. 68  While this language prevents a person from being charged with the
same crime twice, it does leave open the possibility that a person may face a
combination of civil and criminal charges on the same subject matter without a
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
69
When determining whether a civil remedy will violate the double jeopardy
clause, the court must determine whether the remedy is "so unreasonable or
70excessive" that it is actually a criminal penalty. If the court determines that a
civil penalty is as excessive as a criminal penalty, the civil remedy will be
barred.7 1 Two examples of civil remedies that have traditionally been found to
be free of a criminal nature have been the "revocation of a privilege voluntarily
granted[, such as a professional license, . . . and the payment of fixed or
66. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1(d) (2008) (calling for the "[p]rosecution [of]
misdemeanors [to] be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime"). The
time period in which the prosecution must occur may be extended, provided that the person is not
a resident of the state, the person who committed the crime remains unknown, or the crime itself
remains unknown. See id. § 17-3-2(l)-(2). Other states call for a statute of limitations of three
years to bring a manslaughter prosecution. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 801 (West 2008); see
also COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-401(1)(a) (imposing a statute of limitations of three years for the
charge of manslaughter).
67. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 2008) (calling for the
prosecution of a felony within five years of the commission of the crime). As in other states, the
time period to bring a criminal prosecution will not include any period where the accused was out
of the state or his whereabouts were unknown. Id. § 30.10.4(a). Even when the circumstances
prevent the statutory clock from running, the period is not indefinite, as in New York where the
"limitation [cannot] be extended by more than five years beyond the period otherwise applicable
.... .Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(b)(1) (2007) (imposing a five year statute of
limitations).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 95-96 (1997).
70. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956).
71. See id. The factors used by the Supreme Court in deciding the true nature of a penalty
are
[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned ....
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted). However, no
one factor is dispositive. See id. at 169.
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variable sums of money. ' 2 Because damages sought by civil wrongful death
73
claims are typically monetary, criminal charges would not prevent anindividual from bringing a civil claim if it was still a possibility.74
C. Attaching Criminality to the Individual and the Organization
An owner's liability may be created and limited solely by the duties listed in
the contract between the commercial parties.75 Because they are not parties to
the contract, the duties owed to third parties stem from the nature of the
profession itself.76 Thus, when an engineer's work falls below the designated
professional level of care, he and his company will be liable for any injury a
third party may suffer.77
1. The Imposition of Duty Through Statute and Ethical Codes
Like many groups of professionals in this country, engineers have a
licensing board with requirements that vary by state.75 States have enacted
72. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399-400 & n.2 (1938).
73. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 470 (2005).
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. See Eugene J. Farrug, The Necessity of Expert Testimony in Establishing the Standard of
Care for Design Professionals, 38 DEPAUL L. REv. 873, 887 (1989).
76. See id. Further, the contract will only list the work to be done, not the standard that the
designer needs to apply while carrying it out. Id. Even when parties insert clauses in their
contracts to limit their liability to each other, these clauses have no effect on the duties that are
owed to the public at large, and are "void as against public policy." Kroger Co. v. Chimneyville
Props., Ltd., 784 F. Supp. 331, 348-49 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (quoting Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d
378, 382 (Miss. 1982)). In the event parties do not limit the liability between each other through
contract,
[t]he responsibility resting on an architect is essentially the same as that which rests
upon the lawyer to his client, or upon the physician to his patient, or which rests upon
any one to another where such person pretends to possess some skill and ability in
some special employment, and offers his services to the public on account of his fitness
to act in the line of business for which he may be employed. The undertaking of an
architect implies that he possesses skill and ability, including taste, sufficient to enable
him to perform the required services at least ordinarily and reasonably well; and that he
will exercise and apply, in the given case, his skill and ability, his judgment and taste,
reasonably and without neglect.
Coombs v. Beede, 36 A. 104, 104-05 (Me. 1896); see also Farrug, supra note 75, at 877 n.10
(quoting the Coombs decision).
77. See, e.g., Farrug, supra note 75, at 879.
78. See ALA. CODE § 34-11-4 (LexisNexis 2007). In New York an applicant needs to do the
following:
1. To qualify for a license as a professional engineer an applicant shall fulfill the
following requirements:
(1) Application: file an application with the department;
(2) Education: have received an education, including a bachelor's or higher
degree based on a program in engineering, in accordance with the commissioner's
regulations;
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statutes that require any individual who wishes to practice engineering to
obtain board licensing. Upon meeting a state's requirements to obtain a
license, the individual will be issued a certificate demonstrating the board's
approval and authorization to practice. Once an individual is licensed, he
obtains a seal that, accompanied by his signature, will be placed on every plan
he approves in his capacity as a professional engineer.
81
State requirements suggest that only a licensed engineer will be permitted to
82do design work. On further examination, however, the requirements explain
that non-licensed individuals not only can, but must, do design work in order to
obtain their own licenses.83 Although this requirement calls on the licensed
(3) Experience: have at least four years in work satisfactory to the board,
provided that the board may accept study beyond the bachelor's degree in partial
fulfillment of this requirement;
(4) Examination: pass an examination satisfactory to the board and in
accordance with the commissioner's regulations;
(5) Age: be at least twenty-one years of age;
(6) Citizenship or immigration status: be a United States citizen or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States;
(7) Character: be of good moral character as determined by the department; and
(8) Fees: pay a fee of two hundred twenty dollars to the department for
admission to a department conducted examination and for an initial license, a fee
of one hundred fifteen dollars for each reexamination, a fee of one hundred thirty-
five dollars for an initial license for persons not requiring admission to a
department conducted examination, and a fee of two hundred ten dollars for each
triennial registration period.
4. On recommendation of the board, the department may waive specific
requirements, except as to age, character, education and citizenship, in the case of
applicants who are possessed of established and recognized standing in the engineering
profession and who have practiced lawfully for more than fifteen years.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7206 (McKinney 2001).
79. See ALA. CODE § 34-11-2(a) (condemning a person who is not licensed from practicing
or holding himself out as an engineer); see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7202 (preventing anyone not
licensed to practice or portray himself as a "'professional engineer').
80. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-11-7(a).
81. See, e.g., id. § 34-11-7(c). By placing his seal and signature on a plan, the engineer is
certifying that the work it represents was done by him or under his supervision. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-25-117(3) (2007).
82. See ALA. CODE § 34-11-2(a) ("No person in either public or private capacity shall
practice or offer to practice engineering ... unless he or she shall first have submitted evidence
that he or she is qualified so to practice and shall be licensed by the board .... "); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 471.031 (1 )(a) (West 2006) (explaining that a person may not practice engineering unless
he is licensed); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-15-7(a) (2005) ("It shall be unlawful for any person other
than a professional engineer to practice or to offer to practice professional engineering in this
state."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 327.191 (West 2008) (stating that no person shall practice as a
professional engineer without being licensed or authorized by the state).
83. See ALA. CODE § 34-11-4(l)(a)(1) (requiring at least four years of engineering work
after obtaining an engineering degree prior to being eligible for licensure); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
7206 (requiring four years of work experience or additional education beyond a college degree
prior to being eligible for licensure).
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engineer to delegate his work, the liability ultimately remains with him
because he is required to review and approve any work performed by non-
licensed engineers.
84
In addition to statutory obligations, engineers must also adhere to the
national code of ethics.85 An enineer affects the lives of all the people that
come into contact with his work. For this reason, the engineering ethics code
prohibits an engineer from aiding a person or firm that is illegally practicing
engineering, and requires an engineer to report alleged violations to the
"appropriate professional bodies ... [or] public authorities."87 In addition to
reporting others' violations, one of the engineer's most important
responsibilities is to report his own violations.88 Violations include not only
flaws in designs that are being constructed, but also flaws in product or service
advertisements.
89
The duties an engineer accepts upon entering the profession revolve around
the first fundamental canon: an engineer shall "[h]old paramount the safety,
84. See State Bd. of Registration for Prof'I Eng'rs v. Rogers, 120 So. 2d 772, 775 (Miss.
1960). While the work is delegable, the liability is not and it is left to the professional to
determine whether to approve or reject his subordinates' work. Id at 775-76.
85. NSPE, supra note 7. An engineer's "[flailure to follow.., codes of ethics can . .. give
rise to legal liability and disciplinary action against individuals bound by the applicable code."
SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 123.
86. See NSPE, supra note 7, at Preamble. There are six fundamental cannons that an
engineer must strive to fulfill in the course of his work:
1. Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
2. Perform services only in areas of their competence.
3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
4. Act for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees.
5. Avoid deceptive acts.
6. Conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully so as to enhance
the honor, reputation, and usefulness of the profession.
Id. § .
87. Id. § II(l)(e)-(t).
88. See id. § IlI(l)(a)-(b). William LeMessurier, designer of the Citicorp tower in New
York City, learned that his design neglected to consider an important design component, the
consequence of which was that the building could potentially fail-in other words, fall down. Joe
Morgenstern, The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis, THE NEW YORKER, May 29, 1995, at 45, 46-48. To
fix the problem, LeMessurier needed to "blow the whistle ... on himself," exposing himself to
enormous liability. Id. at 48. When he weighed the personal problems he would face against the
consequences of remaining silent, namely, "betting other people's lives," it was clear that he had
to speak up. Id. LeMessurier himself best explained the responsibility given to an engineer:
"'You have a social obligation .... In return for getting a license and being regarded with
respect, you're supposed to be self-sacrificing and look beyond the interests of yourself and your
client to society as a whole."' Id. at 53.
89. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.1(b)(12)(i)(a)-(e) (2007). Flaws in
product or service advertisement include, but are not limited to, any "false, fraudulent, deceptive
or misleading [statements,] . . . guarantees [of] any service[,] . . . [or] claim[s] relating to
professional services or products . . . which cannot be substantiated by the licensee." Id. §
29.1 (b)(1 2)(i)(a)-(c).
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health, and welfare of the public." 90 When an engineer undertakes or fails to
undertake an act and that act or omission "demonstrates a conscious
indifference to a professional duty[, it] would appear to be a reckless act or
more seriousl,.,] a willful and wanton abrogation of professional
responsibility."1
2. When to Charge a Corporation and Its Agents or Officers
The application of criminal law to a corporation is based on the premise that
"[a] corporation is whatever the relevant state law says it is." 92 At one point, a
93 . 94corporation was seen as an artificial being  incapable of committing a crime.
States have since modified their statutes to attach criminal liability to acts
committed by corporations.
95
90. NSPE, supra note 7, § I(I). Conflicts with this duty can arise in any form, but in most
cases, conflicts will arise in the attempt "to save money or otherwise further the client's or
employer's interest." SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 125. When these types of situations arise, an
engineer must remember that "[t]he duty to the public encompasses more than safety[,] ... [i]t
also includes a duty to act with fairness and integrity." Id.
91. Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof'l Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524,
533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). Awareness of a duty can derive from:
The very nature of the obligations and responsibility of a professional engineer would
appear to make evident to him the probability of harm from his conscious indifference
to professional duty and conscious indifference includes indifference to the harm as
well as to the duty. The ... engineer's duty is to determine that the ... plans which he
designs or approves will provide... safety because if they do not[,] a strong probability
of harm exists. Indifference to the duty is indifference to the harm.
Id.
92. EPSTEIN, FREER, ROBERTS & SHEPHERD, supra note 16, at 148.
93. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(explaining that "[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law").
94. See S. Ry. Co. v. State, 54 S.E. 160, 161 (Ga. 1906) (explaining the old rule that a
corporation "was created for lawful purposes and had no power to do anything unlawful").
95. In Delaware, a corporation can be guilty of a crime when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on organizations by law; or
(2) [t]he conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited,
requested, commanded or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting within the scope of employment and in behalf of the
organization ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 281(1)-(2) (2007). California has also imposed corporate liability
through the combination of multiple statutes. California's first step was to make "the word
'person' include[] a corporation as well as a natural person." CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West
1999). Next it determined that "all persons are capable of committing crimes." Id. § 26. Finally
it provided that "[a]ll persons who commit, in whole or in part, any crime" can be punished under
state law. Id. § 27(a)(1). In addition, the California case law explains why corporations may be
charged with committing crimes against property or persons. See Granite Constr. Co. v. Super.
Ct. of Fresno County, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 5 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the theory that a
corporation cannot benefit from a crime against the person fails to consider "economic benefits
•.. [gained through] shortcut[ting] expensive safety precautions, respond[ing] forcibly to strikes,
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Corporate liability for crimes has primarily been determined by state
statutes. 96 Whether a corporate agent or officer can be held personally liable
for crimes of the corporation has been decided through case law in some
jurisdictions9
7 and by statute in others.
98
Those states that determine liability through case law tend to base liability
on whether an agent or officer actually participated in the act or omission, or if
the agent or officer had knowledge or control over those responsible. 99 The
extension of corporate liability to an agent or officer is based largely on the
fact that "[a] corporation can only act through its agents. Their acts, within the
scope of their authority, are the acts of the corporation."'' 00 The very nature of
or engageting] in criminal anticompetitive behavior."). While California uses multiple statutes
and case law, New York finds that a corporation can be held responsible when:
(a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(b) [t]he conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited,
requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the
corporation; or
(c) [t]he conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the
corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the
corporation, and the offense is (i) a misdemeanor or a violation, (ii) one defined by a
statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on a
corporation, or (iii) any offense set forth in title twenty-seven of article seventy-one of
the environmental conservation law.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20.2(a)-(c) (McKinney 2004).
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.25; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 282.
99. See Otis v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 82 P. 853, 854 (Cal. 1905); see also Sea
Horse Ranch v. Super. Ct. of San Mateo County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 688-89 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that the president of a corporation could be charged with involuntary manslaughter
where it was shown that he had knowledge of the potential of escaping horses which caused the
victim's death, and also had sufficient control to order corrections to the fence they escaped
through); People v. Conway, 117 Cal. Rptr. 251, 258 (Ct. App. 1974) (concluding that the
president of a car dealership had control over the business and allowed illegal activities to
continue after being warned repeatedly); People v. Epstein, 4 P.2d 555, 556 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1931) (declaring that the signing of checks was direct participation in activity of illegally
misappropriating corporate funds); People v. Int'l Steel Corp., 226 P.2d 587, 592 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 195 1) (emphasizing that knowledge alone is not enough to make a person, like a
corporate secretary who possessed no control over the illegal operations, liable for the actions of
the corporation).
100. Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924, 926 (Colo. 1904) (holding that an agent
of a corporation in performing his job should know or should be able to determine whether he or
a person under his control was engaging in illegal activity); see also Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217
N.W. 412, 415 (Wis. 1928) ("Corporations must of necessity act through their agents .... lfthe
acts are within the scope of the authority of the agent, the corporation is liable criminally for the
acts although the acts may not have been expressly authorized by the corporation, even if the
corporation has expressly forbidden its agent to act in the manner that made it answerable to
punishment under the criminal law." (citing Overland Cotton Mill, 75 P. at 926.)).
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being an officer or agent of a corporation provides the person with the powers
and added responsibilities of overseeing the work and actions undertaken by
his subordinates. ' 0 1
In the jurisdictions that apply corporate liability to an agent or officer by
statute, the statutory language suggests that a person must have been the one
committing the act on the coporation's behalf or must have been in control of
those who committed the act.
I°2
D. The Evolution of Manslaughter and the Punishments Tied to Convictions
Even though manslaughter classifications' 0 3 and punishments1°4 vary from
state to state, the current statutes all stem from the general definition of
manslaughter that was created at common law.'
0 5
1. Involuntary Manslaughter at Common Law
An act may be criminal even if it is without statutory regulation when it
reaches a level of negligence higher than that of ordinary negligence. 106 The
act must be shown to either disregard the possibility that harm would be
inflicted on human life or indifference to the possible results. 17 Types of
negligence that have been found sufficient to make an act criminal include
negligence that is "aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless."',0 8  The exact
definition of what can make a negligent act become a criminal act is
determined by each state.'
0 9
101. See State ex rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 251 N.W. 478, 485 (Wis. 1933). When an officer or
agent's job responsibilities include the management or control over subordinates, failing to be
aware of the actions creates liability just as if the officer or agent had given his approval. Id
102. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.2; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 282.
103. See infra Part I.D.2.
104. See infra Part I.D.3.
105. See infra Part 1.D. 1.
106. See 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210 (1940) [hereinafter Homicide]. Negligence is defined
as "[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have
exercised in a similar situation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
107. See Homicide, supra note 106, at § 210; see also 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 61 (2008)
(following the theory that more than ordinary negligence is required to create criminality).
108. Homicide, supra note 106, at § 210 (footnotes omitted).
109. See infra Part I.D.2.
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2. Variations of Manslaughter in Current State Statutes
Of the jurisdictions surveyed, culpable negligence,' 10 criminal negligence," 1
and recklessness 1 2 were the various standards required to attach criminality toan act.
a. Culpable Negligence
Both the Florida and Mississippi legislatures have decided that a person
commits manslaughter when he kills a human being through culpable
negligence.113 The definition of culpable negligence has come from case law
of the jurisdictions; in Florida culpable negligence has been defined as:
[N]egligence ... of a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless
disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its
dangerous effects; or there is that entire want of care which would
raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or
which shows wantonness or recklessness or a grossly careless
disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless
indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an
intentional violation of them."14
The difference between gross and culpable negligence is that the former is a
disregard for the possible outcome, as opposed to the latter, which is a
realization and indifference to what may transpire. 115 Culpable negligence can
110. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07(1) (West 2007); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-47 (West
2005).
111. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-105
(2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 631 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3(a) (2007); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.024(3) (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2004).
112. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
104(l)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 632(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3404(a) (Supp. 2006); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.024(l)(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15.
113. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.07(1) ("[T]he killing of a human being by the act,
procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification ... is manslaughter
.... "); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-47 (defining each "killing of a human being, by the act,
procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law . . . shall be
manslaughter").
114. Florida S. Ry. Co. v. Hirst, II So. 506, 513 (Fla. 1892); see also Miller v. State, 75 So.
2d 312, 313-14 (Fla. 1954); Cannon v. State, 107 So. 360, 363 (Fla. 1926); Sapp v. State, 913 So.
2d 1220, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). Mississippi's definition of culpable negligence is as
follows:
[N]egligence of a higher degree than that which in civil cases is held to be gross
negligence, and must be a negligence of a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a
wanton disregard of, or utter indifference to, the safety of human life, and that this shall
be so clearly evidenced as to place it beyond every reasonable doubt.
Smith v. State, 20 So. 2d 701, 706 (Miss. 1945).
115. See Smith, 20 So. 2d at 705 ("[Clulpable negligence should be defined as the conscious
and wanton or reckless disregard of the probabilities of fatal consequences to others as a result of
the willful creation of an unreasonable risk thereof.").
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be achieved through the specific act that caused death or through the actions
that "set the stage" for the resulting death.' 
16
b. Criminal Negligence
The term criminal negligence can have different meanings depending on
whether it is used in a manslaughter statute11 7 or a criminal negligence
statute.'8
i. Criminal Negligence in a Manslaughter Statute
In jurisdictions that require criminal negligence to support a manslaughter
charge, the term is not expressly listed in the statutory language, 119 but like the
culpable negligence jurisdictions, is applied through case law.' 20  The
definition of criminal negligence used by the California courts requires that
"[t]he negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless,
that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from
what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man
under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper
regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or
an indifference to consequences."'
21
When the Georgia courts chose a definition of criminal negligence, they chose
a simpler definition, making it equivalent to recklessness.
122
116. See Dolan v. State, 85 So. 2d 139, 159 (Fla. 1956); see also Sapp, 913 So. 2d at 1225-
26 (finding that the defendant could be found guilty of manslaughter for an accidental shooting
that occurred when the defendant operated a gun without knowledge of how it worked while in a
group of people and under the influence of drugs and alcohol).
117. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3(a)
(2007).
118. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-105 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 631 (2007); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.024.3 (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 2004).
119. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (defining manslaughter as "the unlawful killing of a
human being without malice ... in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony;
or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or
without due caution and circumspection"); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3(b) (stating that
manslaughter is committed when "in the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner [a
person] causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so, by the
commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm").
120. See People v. Hurley, 56 P.2d 978, 982 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (determining that
"without due caution and circumspection" is the equivalent of criminal negligence); Geele v.
State, 47 S.E.2d 283, 287 (Ga. 1948) (determining that criminal negligence is required to commit
manslaughter).
121. People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (Cal. 1955) (adopting 26 AM. JUR. Homicide § 210
(1940) as the general rule).
122. See Geele, 47 S.E.2d at 287. In explaining what it meant by reckless, the court
explained that "[c]riminal negligence must be such as shows an indifference to the injurious
results of the negligent acts." Id. The actor needs to have been aware of the risk that his action
may cause harm to others and must have made the decision to ignore that risk. Id. While the
realization of the risk is usually assessed based on what the ordinary person would or would not
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ii. Criminally Negligent Homicide
The jurisdictions that have created a separate crime for criminally negligent
homicide have codified their definitions of that term. 123 Although the exact
language may vary by jurisdiction, criminal negligence may occur when a
person
fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result
will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation.12
4
This definition requires no more than ordinary negligence.1 25 The application
of criminal negligence will depend on whether the actor had knowledge and
was aware of the risk his actions created.'
26
c. Recklessness
The third standard that several jurisdictions have adopted for manslaughter
is when a person "recklessly causes the death of another person."'127 Similar to
the criminally negligent homicide statutes, legislatures vary in their definitions
know, if the actor had special knowledge that the circumstances were dangerous and that a
regular person would not have had that knowledge, electing to ignore those circumstances could
create criminal liability. Id.
123. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(3); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 231(d); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 562.016.5 (West 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4).
124. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05(4).
125. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004) (defining negligence as "[t]he
failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a
similar situation").
126. See People v. Montanez, 359 N.E.2d 371, 374 (N.Y. 1976). There is a difference
between being oblivious to a risk and being unable to foresee that an act may cause the risk to
occur. People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that while a
company was aware that its production process created the possibility of an explosion, it was not
possible for it to foresee the spark that caused the explosion, thereby preventing the attachment of
criminal liability to its actions); see also Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1998)
(determining that when a person was familiar with the use of fire arms, it could not be said that he
was unaware of the risk of death that could occur from pointing a loaded fire arm at another
person); People v. Shaw, 646 P.2d 375, 380 (Colo. 1982) (explaining that a killing that resulted
from a failure to perceive that attempting suicide may induce the intervention of a third party,
thereby putting the third party at risk, was a "gross deviation from reasonable care" and could
create criminal negligence).
127. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-3(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2005); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
104(l)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 632(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3404(a) (2007); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.024.1(1) (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15.1; Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.06.1.
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of recklessness, but in general, a person will be deemed to have acted
recklessly when:
[H]e is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance
exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard
thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.'
28
In some circumstances, recklessness can be charged as partial knowledge, or
knowledge that a risk exists without knowing for certain whether the risk will
materialize. 129 Even when an actor is aware that a result could occur, if he
does not know of the circumstance that could bring about the result, he cannot
be said to have acted recklessly.1 30 The criminality is based on the awareness
of the cause of a risk and the choice to disregard that risk's existence.
1 31
3. State Standards of Punishment
The various punishments applicable to an engineer and his company include
fines, loss of license, and prison sentences.132 Similar to the definitions of the
crimes themselves, each state has its own valuation of the punishment
warranted for conviction. 
33
128. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(3); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(8); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 231(c) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201(c); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.016.4 (West
1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05.3 (McKinney 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.24.1 (West 2005).
129. See State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. 2000); see also State v. Gaskins, 66
S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that even though the defendant had no
intention to shoot a gun, when he got into a fight with a loaded gun in his pocket without knowing
if the safety was engaged, a jury could determine he acted recklessly when the gun discharged
during the fight).
130. See Warner-Lambert Co., 414 N.E.2d at 665 (conceding that even though a company
knew that its production process created the possibility of an explosion, when the explosion was
caused by a spark that the company had not foreseen, and had not taken precautions against, it
could not have acted recklessly).
131. See State v. Jenkins, 39 P.3d 47, 56 (Kan. 2002) (distinguishing between a person who
knew he was susceptible to suffering epileptic seizures and elected to continue driving from a
person who suffered a seizure for the first time while driving). Although recklessness can be
shown through a medical or other formal diagnosis, it can also be inferred from the perpetrator's
actions. State v. Hill, 111 P.3d 178, 182 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that a driver who was
repeatedly forced to bring his truck back on the road could determine that he was falling asleep at
the wheel without the benefit of a diagnosis that he suffered from sleep apnea). When a person
consciously disregards a known risk, his action is in direct opposition to the actions of a
reasonable person who evaluates possible negative outcomes before electing to act. Sanchez v.
People, 820 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Colo. 1991). Determining recklessness, however, does not always
require an overt act; when a person has a duty to act, a failure to act will take the place of an overt
act. State v. Williquette, 285 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Wis. 1986).
132. See discussion infra Parts l.D.3.a-b.
133. See discussion infra Parts 1.D.3.a-b.
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a. Prison Sentences and Fines
The idea that a corporation is not a legal entity capable of acting unlawfully
is a notion that has been repudiated. 13  Even though a corporation is now
generally seen as a person when it comes to its ability to commit a crime, the
punishment that may be imposed differs from that which is available to a living
135person.
The Supreme Court has helped clarify the type of punishment that can be
applied to a corporation. 136 The Court noted in United States v. Union Supply
Co. that when a statute explicitly lists imprisonment as the only punishment
available for a crime, a corporation cannot be subject to punishment under the
statute. 37 However, when a statute presents the option of imposing either a
fine, imprisonment, or both, the state has the ability to impose any punishment
that is applicable.' 38 Using this notion, many jurisdictions have taken different
approaches regarding the type and degree of punishment their crimes will
mandate.
139
Jurisdictions such as Colorado, Georgia, Mississippi, and Wisconsin elected
to follow a path similar to the one described by the Supreme Court and created
statutes that express an applicable prison sentence as well as a fine. 14° Other
jurisdictions such as Alabama, California, Delaware, Florida, Missouri, and
New York have separated the sentence of a fine from the sentence of
imprisonment, providing each with its own statutory provision.1 No matter
how the statutes were drafted, each jurisdiction has provided a punishment that
has the potential to attach to a corporation.142
134. See S. Ry. Co. v. State, 54 S.E. 160, 161 (Ga. 1906) (explaining that the old rule that a
corporation was only created for undertaking lawful purposes and therefore could not be indicted
with a crime has been abrogated).
135. See id. (indicating that although a corporation may be fined, it cannot be imprisoned).
136. See United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909) (acknowledging that
while a corporation may not be imprisoned, if a statute allows for a fine in addition to
imprisonment, the statute may apply to the corporation).
137. See id at 54.
138. See id at 55.
139. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text.
140. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(I)-(III)(A) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
3(a)-(b) (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3) (West
2005).
141. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a) (LexisNexis 2005); id. § 13A-5-1 1(a) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007); id. § 13A-6-3(a) (LexisNexis 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(a)-(c) (West. 2008); id. §
672 (West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(a)-(b); id. § 4208; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082
(West Supp. 2008); id. § 775.083 (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.011 (West Supp. 2007);
id. § 560.011 (West 1999); id. § 560.021; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney Supp. 2008); id.
§ 80.00 (McKinney 2004); id. § 80.10.
142. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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In addition to deciding how to impose a fine against a corporation, 143 state
legislatures also had to determine whether the corporation would be treated
like every other human person' 44 or whether it would be held to a higher
standard. Even when state legislatures decide to treat individuals and
corporations equally, there is no state uniformity in the maximum fine
available. 146 States such as Georgia have set the maximum fine at $1000,147
while states such as Delaware have not set a limit.148 Statutes like Delaware's
leave in the hands of the court complete discretion regarding the fine
imposed. 49 Another approach calls for no specific fine value, but imposes a
penalty double the benefit or gain attained through commission of the crime.
150
Of the jurisdictions that allow higher fines for corporations, some go as far
as allowing the maximum to be double that which may be imposed on an
individual. 51 These are also jurisdictions that consider the benefit or gain
143. See People v. Charter Thrift & Loan, 106 Cal. Rptr. 364, 365-66 (Ct. App. 1973)
(explaining that California created section 672 of its penal code to provide the legislature with the
ability to transform any crimes that only listed prison sentences as punishment to crimes that also
carried the peanlty of a fine, making them applicable to corporations); State ex rel. Losey v.
Willard, 54 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1951) (acknowledging that when the only punishment for an
offense is imprisonment a corporation may not be held liable, but when a fine may also be
imposed, the corporation can be made to answer for its crimes).
144. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(2)(b) (providing that corporations will be held to
the same range of fines as individuals); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-1 1; CAL. PENAL CODE §
672; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(k) (allowing imposition of any fine the court deems
appropriate); id. § 4208(1) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.083.1(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-
3(a)(1); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50.3(d).
145. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.011.1 (describing fine that may apply to an
individual), and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00.1 (same), with Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.021 (describing
the amount of fine that can be placed on a corporation), and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.10.1
(describing fine that may apply to a corporation).
146. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-1 l(a)(2) (allowing a fine of up to $30,000 for a manslaughter
conviction); CAL. PENAL CODE § 672 (allowing a fine of up to $10,000 for a manslaughter
conviction); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(III)(A) (allowing a fine within the range of
$2000 to $500,000 for a manslaughter conviction); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.083.1(b) (allowing a
fine of up to $10,000 to be imposed for a conviction of manslaughter); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-
25 (calling for a minimum fine of $500 for a manslaughter conviction); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
939.50.3(d) (allowing a fine of up to $100,000 to be imposed for a conviction of manslaughter).
147. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a)(1).
148. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4208(1).
149. See id.
150. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-1 l(a)(4). The term "gain" is defined as "the amount of money
or the value of property derived from the commission of the crime, less the amount of money or
the value of property returned to the victim of the crime or seized or surrendered to lawful
authority prior to the time sentence is imposed." Id. § 13A-5-1 l(b).
151. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.011.1(1) (West 1999) (allowing a $5000 fine to be imposed
on an individual convicted of manslaughter); id. § 560.021.1(1) (allowing a $10,000 fine to be
imposed on a corporation convicted of manslaughter); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00.1 (a) (McKinney
2004) (allowing a $5000 fine to be imposed on an individual convicted of manslaughter); id §
80.10.1 (a) (allowing a fine of up to $10,000 for a corporation convicted of manslaughter).
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acquired in commission of the crime when setting the amount of the fine.'
52
Even when a fine is based on benefit or gain, it is typically capped by a
statutory maximum for the specified crime. 153  New York takes a slightly
different approach by allowing the fine to be double the amount of the gain,
even if the fine exceeds the amount listed for that specific crime.'
54
Just as the amounts of fines differ from state to state, so too do the prison
sentences that may be imposed. 55 One of the key differences is the level at
which the felony offense will be classified. Higher-level felonies tend to
increase prison time. 156 Beyond the difference of opinion among legislatures
as to what type of crime has been committed, each jurisdiction has its own
valuation of the severity of manslaughter and the punishment appropriate for
conviction. Some states, like Georgia, have determined that involuntary
manslaughter is no more than a misdemeanor carrying with it a maximum
sentence of twelve months in prison. 157 Other states, like Wisconsin, prescribe
more severe prison sentences of up to twenty-five years for a similar
offense.' 5 8 States like Georgia and Wisconsin represent the extreme ends of
152. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.011.1(2); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00.1(b).
153. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5- 11 (a)(2) (capping the maximum fine for manslaughter at
$30,000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.011.1(1) (setting a maximum fine for manslaughter at $5000).
154. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.10.1(e).
155. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
156. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-105 (2008) (defining criminally negligent homicide as a
class five felony); see also id. § 18-3-104(2) (defining manslaughter as a class four felony). In
Colorado a class five felony carries with it a prison sentence of one to two years. See id § 18-
1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A). The maximum sentence for a class five felony becomes the minimum
sentence for a class-four felony, which proscribes a two-to-six-year prison sentence. See id In
Delaware, criminal negligence is categorized as a class E felony. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
631 (2007). Conviction for this type of felony can yield up to five years in prison. See id. §
4205(b)(5). Unlike Colorado, the Delaware legislature felt there was a greater difference between
criminally negligent homicide and manslaughter, and accordingly classified manslaughter a class
B felony. See id. § 632 (2007). The difference is demonstrated further by the applicable prison
sentence for a conviction of a class B felony, which has a range of two to twenty-five years. See
id § 4205(b)(2). Missouri and New York provide examples of other states that have created
different levels of punishment somewhere in between the negligible difference of Colorado and
the extreme difference of Delaware. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.024.4 (West Supp. 2008)
(labeling involuntary manslaughter by criminal negligence as a class D felony); id. § 565.024.2
(labeling involuntary manslaughter committed recklessly as a class C felony); id. § 558.011.1(4)
(imposing a possible prison sentence of up to four years for a class D felony); id. § 558.011.1(3)
(imposing a possible prison sentence of up to seven years for a class C felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.10 (classifying criminally negligent homicide as a class E felony); id. § 125.15 (classifying
manslaughter as a class C felony); id. § 70.00.2(e) (McKinney Supp. 2008) (calling for a prison
sentence of up to four years for conviction of a class E felony); id § 70.00.2(c) (calling for a
prison sentence of up to fifteen years for the conviction of a class C felony).
157. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3(b) (2007).
158. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50.3(d) (West 2005); see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-
6(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing a prison sentence of two to twenty years for a manslaughter
conviction); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(2) (imposing a prison sentence of two to twenty-
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the spectrum.159 Prison sentences in other jurisdictions tend to fall somewhere
in the middle, ranging anywhere from two to fifteen years.
160
b. Loss of License
Another punishment that may be applied is the loss of a professional license.
The issuance of a license is a privilege a state bestows on individuals; thus, it is
one that the state may also revoke.' Many states leave licensing
determinations in the hands of the state licensing board. 62 These boards are
equipped with a number of options to deal with complaints aimed at the
engineering profession, and ultimately, a board may choose to revoke an
engineer's license altogether. 63 The acts or omissions that can invoke board
punishment include those of "gross negligence, incompetency, or
unprofessional conduct,"' 64 as well as the commission and conviction of a
crime' 65 while undertaking the work and the duties of a professional engineer.
It may seem logical that revocation of a license would be a permanent ban;
however, some states have proceedings whereby an individual may seek
reinstatement of a license.' 66 In California, although it is typical for a period of
at least three years to pass before reinstatement will even be considered, it is
nonetheless within the board's discretion to allow a shorter time period of only
167one year.
five years for a manslaughter conviction); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 (West 2005) (imposing a
prison sentence ranging from two to twenty years for a manslaughter conviction).
159. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50.3(d).
160. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(b) (West 2008) (imposing a prison sentence of two
to four years for a manslaughter conviction); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) (listing
a two-to-six-year prison sentence for a manslaughter conviction); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.082.3(c) (West Supp. 2008) (imposing a maximum fifteen year prison sentence for
conviction of a second degree felony such as manslaughter); MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.011.1(3)
(listing a prison sentence of up to seven years for a manslaughter conviction); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
70.00.2(c) (listing a prison sentence of up to fifteen years for a manslaughter conviction).
161. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-11-11(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (stating that the board has the
power to affect the status of all licenses); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6775 (West Supp. 2008)
(granting the board the ability to "investigate complaints ... and make findings"); see also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-25-108(1) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-15-19(a) (2005).
163. See ALA. CODE § 34-11-1 (a) (other potential penalties include "reprimand, censure,
place[ment] on probation, or [imposition of a] fine").
164. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-15-19(a)(2).
165. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-15-19(4) (explaining that conviction may "include a finding
or verdict of guilt, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere in a criminal proceeding
regardless of whether the adjudication of guilt or sentence is withheld or not entered thereon");
see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6775(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-25-108(l)(c).
166. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6780(a).
167. See id. § 6780(a)(1). Although reinstatement is permitted, the board may impose other
terms and conditions on the individual that it deems necessary prior to re-issuing a license. Id. §
6780(d). In the event revocation resulted from a criminal sentence, no petition for reinstatement
is permitted while the individual is serving that criminal sentence. Id. § 6780(e).
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II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE PARTIES, ACTIONS CREATING LIABILITY,
AND THE PUNISHMENT THAT SHOULD ATrACH
A. Who Should be Held Responsible
To achieve a maximum level of deterrence, criminal liability should be
imposed on: the design engineer;' 68 a higher-ranking corporate officer, if
applicable; 169 and the corporation itself' 7u That individuals may be held
criminally liable will make them less likely to risk a potential jail sentence for
the sake of making the corporation extra profit, especially when the criminal
charges cannot be covered by indemnification or through insurance. 71  If
individual liability is also combined with corporate liability, the corporation is
prevented from allowing the individual to take the fall while it reaps a benefit
from the illegal act or omission.
172
An engineer's individual liability may come from his failure to create
designs that will put the "safety, health, and welfare of the public" first in
violation of his stated duty. 173  By affixing his seal to a set of plans, an
engineer asserts either that he performed the work himself, or thoroughly
reviewed the work of another. 74  To do so under any other circumstance
constitutes unprofessional conduct.175 Failing to give the proper attention to
his own work or his supervision of another's work violates the engineer's duty
of safety to the public,1 76 endangers lives, 177 and exposes him to criminal
liability.'
78
A corporate officer's liability can be based on one of two roles he may have
played in an act or omission. 17 First, he could have actually participated in the
168. See supra Part I.CI.
169. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
171. Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1245.
172. Id. at 1253.
173. NSPE, supra note 7, § I(1); see also supra Part I.CI.
174. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.3(a)(3) (2007).
175. Id. (describing types of conduct that will be considered unprofessional if engaged in by
an engineer).
176. NSPE, supra note 7, § I(1).
177. See Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof'I Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d
524, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). In Duncan, the licensed engineer failed to review the work of a
junior engineer working under him, yet approved the work by affixing his seal. Id. The flawed
design caused 142,000 pounds of hotel walkways to crash to the floor, killing one hundred and
fourteen people and injuring many more. Id. at 527.
178. See SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 123.
179. See Otis v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 82 P. 853, 854 (Cal. 1905) (explaining
that in order to charge an officer with criminal liability he needs to have been in control of the act
or have been in control of those performing the act and must have permitted them to undertake
the act).
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criminal act, as is the case when he is the design engineer. 180 Second, through
his placement in a supervisory role, he may have knowledge and control over
the situation and choose either to support the act or fail to prevent it.' 81 The
very nature of a supervisory position calls on the individual to have knowledge
of the problem and to exercise the necessary control to prevent it. 182 That the
corporate officer is aware of the problem and has done nothing to prevent it
functions as an approval of the action.' 83  Alternately, if the supervisor is
unaware of what is occurring, he has failed to fulfill his job requirements by
inadequately supervising and controlling his subordinates.
184
The corporation may be liable for its acceptance of the reckless design, its
failure to prevent it, or simply through the acts of its agents.' 85 Provided that
the agents remain within the limits of their authority, their actions on the
corporation's behalf are imputed as the actions of the corporation.' 
86
B. The Case for Why Criminal Liabilit Is Necessary and the Standard that
Calls for Its Application
Based on the statutes of repose of various jurisdictions, and depending on
when the harm occurred, a criminal action may be the only claim that can be
brought against the perpetrator.187 Even in the instances where a civil action
would be permitted, bringing criminal charges along with a wrongful death suit
would not be a constitutional violation of the double jeopardy clause, 188 and
would promote deterrence by replacing the sting removed by insurance.
189
In terms of what standard of conduct calls for bringing criminal charges,
there are three different versions of manslaughter statutes. Despite the use of
different language, each state will attach criminal liability based on conduct
180. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
181. See Sea Horse Ranch v. Super. Ct. of San Mateo County, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 688-89
(Ct. App. 1994) (holding that when a corporate president who knew of a potential risk and had the
authority to prevent it failed to prevent the risk, it was permissible to charge him with involuntary
manslaughter based on the corporation's crime).
182. See Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924, 926 (Colo. 1904) (advancing that an
agent of a corporation, in performing his job, should know or should be able to determine whether
he or those under his control were engaging in illegal activity).
183. See People v. Conway, 117 Cal. Rptr. 251, 258 (Ct. App. 1974) (concluding that an
officer, who was repeatedly given knowledge of illegal activity and did nothing to remedy it, was
essentially allowing the illegal activity).
184. See State ex rel. Kropfv. Gilbert, 251 N.W. 478, 485 (Wis. 1933) (finding that when an
officer's failure to manage or control subordinates caused him to be unaware of liability that
failure was the equivalent of support).
185. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20.2 (McKinney 2004); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
281 (2007). A corporation is not able to act on its own behalf, it must act through the actions and
omissions of its agents. Overland Cotton Mill Co., 75 P. at 926.
186. See Overland Cotton Mill Co., 75 P. at 926.
187. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part l.B.l.
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that amounts to recklessness.19 The key requirement from each definition of
culpability is the awareness of a risk.19 The awareness and creation of this
risk imposes a duty to prevent people from being harmed by it, 192 and the
failure to perform this duty creates criminal liability.
193
C. What Punishment May Be Imposed?
A corporation is considered an artificial entity and this classification
prevents it from being sentenced to imprisonment. 194  As a result, when a
corporation is found criminally liable, the only punishment the corporation
itself may face is a fine.1
9 5
States have accepted the idea that the only punishment a corporation will
face is the imposition of a fine and have amended their statutes accordingly to
ensure that punishment is available. 96  Despite this fact, jurisdictional
uniformity in fine amounts does not exist. States like Georgia impose
relatively small limits, 197 while states like Delaware leave the fine limit open
and in the hands of the court.'
98
To act as a proper deterrent, fines must be expressed in such a way that a
person or a corporation will see no benefit in undertaking the criminal
conduct. 199 Delaware's statutes allow for the imposition of a fine that has the
potential to create a large financial burden.200  Despite the possibility of a
larger fine, a corporation may find that an open-ended fine range may provide
190. See supra Part I.D.2.
191. See supra notes 114, 121, 128 and accompanying text.
192. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 132 (3d ed. 1999)
(explaining that when a risk is created that places another in harm's way, a duty is created to
prevent that harm from happening).
193. Id.
194. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
195. See United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909) (explaining that
when a statute only lists imprisonment as the acceptable sentence, that sentence will be
inapplicable to a corporation, but if the ability to impose a fine exists, the corporation may be
punished).
196. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
197. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a)(1) (2008) (permitting the imposition of a fine that
cannot exceed $1000).
198. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(k) (2007); id. § 4208(1).
199. See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1366-67. When fines are smaller than
the profit the corporation will receive for the criminal conduct, there is no real deterrent effect.
See Bruce Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 925
(1975).
200. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(k) (permitting the fine imposed on a person to be
left to the discretion of the court); id. § 4208(1) (permitting the fine imposed on an organization
to be left to the discretion of the court).
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201it with a lesser penalty. Alternatively, a small fine, or even one based on
doubling the profit gained by the act,2° 2 may not act as a sufficient deterrent.
Colorado's statute is a good step toward the appropriate level of
deterrence. 203 Colorado fails to address situations where extreme amounts of
profit are made through illegal conduct, but its fine range of $2000 to $500,000
will force most parties to reevaluate the potential cost of their criminal
204conduct. By combining Colorado's fine range with the idea of allowing the
fine to be double the gain created by the criminal conduct, as espoused by
205other states, an even broader range of fines is created that can act as a
deterrent for all.
When discussing the appropriate statutory fine, arguments have been made
that it would be more effective to leave this matter to civil claims.20 6 However,
this argument fails to consider the role of insurance in the payment of
damages, 20 7 and the statutes of repose that may bar civil claims all together.
20 8
With the ability to achieve the desired level of protection for the right price,
20 9
combined with the option of retaining insurance until the expiration of
statutory periods,2 10 the deterrent effect of civil liability is significantly
weakened. Thus, criminal liability with out-of-pocket expenses is the
necessary level of deterrence.
While the fear of being held criminally responsible for a fine will help deter
a corporation from producing flawed designs, combining this criminal
responsibility with individual liability for officers and agents will yield even
better results. If liability is attached to a corporation through its officers or
201. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a)(1) (allowing for the imposition of a $1000 fine). When a
fine is small it acts as little more than a "fee[] for licenses to engage in illegal activities."
Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1366.
202. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.10.1(e) (McKinney 2004). For example, a construction job
may have a profit margin of only 1-5% of the cost of the entire project. ABERDEEN GROUP, INC.,
ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: END-
USER SURVEY RESULTS 1-2 (2004) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
203. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(IIl)(A) (2008) (listing fine ranges that go as
high as $500,000).
204. See id
205. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-1 1(a)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §
560.011.1(1)-(2) (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 560.021.1(6); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00.1(a)-
(b); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.10.1(a), (e).
206. Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1366, 1368-69.
207. See Morgenstern, supra note 88, at 53 (stating that when the parties discussed the
damages resulting from added construction due to the flawed design, the amount settled on was
the amount the design engineer's insurance company was going to pay).
208. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
209. See Neeson, supra note 42, at 42.
210. See SAMUELS, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing the different types of insurance policies
used in the construction industry).
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agents,21' then by imposing personal liability on the officer or agent, liability
may also be imposed on the corporation. When an officer or agent's
conduct212 may force him to serve prison time, his desire to risk his own
personal freedom for the sake of profiting the corporation will be exponentially
213decreased. 3 Personal liability will impose a duty on an officer to vigorously
keep track of the actions of his subordinates so that he can ensure that the
214subordinates are acting with his approval. Criminal liability will cause a
corporation to keep a more watchful eye on its officers and agents, who in turn
will engage in more conscientious supervision of their subordinates, thereby
passing added safety on to the public.
It would seem that the best way to protect the public would be to revoke the
practitioner's license, thereby preventing the individual from working in the
field and inspiring him to practice his craft diligently. Even when an
engineer's license is revoked, the nature of the industry would not prevent the
individual from working, because non-licensed engineers undertake
engineering designs every day. 215 The ability to continue practicing could be
even more prevalent in a corporation where the effect of losing one engineer's
license could be easily overcome as long as another engineer on staff was
licensed and willing to approve the design work. 6 Additionally, depending
on the jurisdiction, it may be possible for an engineer to petition to have his
license reinstated. 17
211. See Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 75 P. 924, 926 (Colo. 1904) (articulating that a
corporation can only act through its agents and requiring that liability based on their actions be
attached to the corporation).
212. See Otis v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 82 P. 853, 854 (Cal. 1905) (holding that
an officer or agent who directly participated in the act or omission, or who had knowledge and
control over those responsible, will be liable himself).
213. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3 1, at 1245 (explaining that when fines are the
only available punishment, the availability of insurance and indemnification provided by the
corporation will not deter the employee from striving to maximize corporate profits).
214. See State ex rel. Kropfv. Gilbert, 251 N.W. 478, 485 (Wis. 1933) (explaining that when
an officer or agent's responsibilities include the management and control over subordinates, being
unaware of their actions creates liability for the superior just as if the subordinate had been given
the superior's approval).
215. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
216. See State Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Eng'rs v. Rogers, 120 So. 2d 772, 775 (Miss.
1960) (explaining that an engineer can delegate work to others but liability remains with him
upon his seal of approval).
217. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6780(a) (West Supp. 2008).
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III. MODIFYING CRIMINAL STATUTES TO MAXIMIZE DETERRENCE AND PUBLIC
WELFARE
The combination of insurance21s and statutes of repose 219 can dramatically
lessen the sting felt by engineers and engineering companies that are held
responsible for reckless designs. By imposing criminal liability on these
groups, they will be forced to look beyond a cost-benefit analysis of potential
risk, and will be encouraged to protect themselves, and derivatively, the
public-at-large.
220
To ensure that the appropriate parties are held responsible, a manslaughter
statute should be drafted as follows:
* (1) A person commits manslaughter through the killing of another
person through a reckless act or omission. For the purposes of this
statute a person shall include any living person or corporate entity.
* (2) An act or omission is committed in a reckless manner when the
actor is aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and consciously
disregards its existence or is indifferent to the potential result.
22 1
* (3) A substantial and unjustifiable risk is one where, when it is
disregarded, it becomes a gross deviation from the standard a
reasonable person would abide by; in the event that the actor has
special knowledge of the situation, the reasonable person will be
considered a reasonable person with similar special knowledge.
222
* (4) On conviction of the charge of manslaughter, a person shall be
sentenced to a term not exceeding seven years imprisonment,223 in
addition to or in lieu of a fine within the range of $2000 to
$500,000, 224 or up to double the gain made through the act.
225
* (5) The applicable fines that may be imposed in addition to or in
lieu of imprisonment are the same range of fines that are to be
imposed on a corporation.
226
* (6) The term "'gain' means the amount of money or the value of
property derived from the commission of the crime, less the amount
218. See supra Part I.B.l.
219. See supra Part I.B.2.
220. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 413 (explaining that when jail sentences are considered a
part of the cost-benefit analysis, a company may no longer look at the situation as a purely
monetary decision).
221. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(3) (LexisNexis 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
501(8) (2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.016.4 (West 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05.3
(McKinney 2004).
222. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-2(3); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-501(8); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
562.016.4; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05.3.
223. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.011.1(3) (West Supp. 2008).
224. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(lll)(A).
225. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00.1(b).
226. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(11I)(A).
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of money or the value of property returned to the victim of the
crime or seized or surrendered to lawful authority prior to the time
sentence is imposed.
227
A statute with this language clearly articulates that both individuals and
corporations may be held responsible, what conduct will make them
responsible, and what punishment may result. The culpability requirement of
recklessness is in line with other jurisdictions' statutes,228 and focuses on the
fact that the actor is aware of the danger he is creating, and has elected to• • • 229
continue his conduct or has refused to rectify the situation.
The range of prison sentences and fines would take into account that even
though the act or omission was reckless, it was not the actor's intent that
someone should die. 230 If an officer or agent knows that criminal liability
could attach and lead to up to seven years in prison, there will be even more
incentive for him to fulfill his duties.23 1 Additionally, a clear range of fines in
combination with a catchall provision for violations that create immense
profits232 allows both an individual and a corporation to evaluate the potential
233.23cost of their actions in a way that many current statutes fail to do.234
There is an argument that imposing a large fine on a corporation causes
innocent stockholders to suffer for criminal conduct that they themselves did
not undertake and that they had no control over.235 While the imposition of a
criminal fine may have a negative effect on corporate stockholders, it is no
greater than the effect of the various civil penalties that a corporation may
227. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-1 l(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
228. See supra Part II.B.
229. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
230. See State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. 2000).
231. See Developments in the Law, supra note 3 1, at 1245.
232. Profit margins on construction work typically fall between 1-5% of the total
construction cost; when dealing with a large project, this small percentage can still yield a very
large profit. See ABERDEEN GROUP, INC., supra note 202, at 1-2. Even using a profit margin of
only 1%, when working on a project like the "Big Dig," which had a final project cost of
$14,000,000,000, the designer would make $140,000,000 in profit. NTSB, supra note 5, at 15.
233. See Developments in the Law, supra note 31, at 1366; see also supra note 200 and
accompanying text.
234. See Coleman, supra note 199, at 925 (expressing that if the cost of a fine is less than the
derived benefit, the fine acts merely as a fee for undertaking illegal conduct); see also ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-1 l(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (allowing for a fine of up to $30,000); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 672 (West 1999) (allowing a fine of up to $10,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.083.1(b)
(West 2005) (allowing for a fine of up to $10,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a)(1)(Supp. 2007)
(providing a $1000 fine); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.011.1(1) (West 1999) (allowing a fine of up to
$5000 for an individual); id. § 560.021.1(1) (allowing a fine of up to $10,000 for a corporation);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00.1(a) (McKinney 2004) (allowing a fine of up to $5000 for an
individual); id. § 80.10.1(a), (e) (allowing a fine for up to $10,000 or double the gain for a
corporation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.50.3(d) (West 2005) (allowing a fine of up to $100,000).
235. See Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 837
(1927).
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already face. 23 6 In addition, a corporation is typically in the best position to
address and prevent the harm from occurring in the first place. 237  A
corporation's position as the entity best able to prevent the harm, coupled with
the societal interest in public safety, trumps the stockholders' concerns about
reduced profitability. 238  Stricter punishments for all parties involved in
reckless design and construction cases will motivate all who are involved to
adhere to the duties of the industry.
239
IV. CONCLUSION
Current involuntary manslaughter statutes create the opportunity for an
engineering corporation to be assessed a minor fine, 240 while allowing an
engineer or officer to face prison time.241 By adopting a statute that maintains
a potential prison sentence for officers and engineers who fail to do their
duties, 242 as well as imposing harsher fines on corporations, 243 a level of
deterrence is created that is not possible through civil damages alone.244 Both
corporations and individuals must be held directly responsible for their
criminal conduct in order to prevent recklessly flawed designs from entering
public use.
236. Id. Society has accepted that innocent stockholders must face the penalties imposed on
their corporations with regard to civil matters. See id. Because the punishment the stockholder
will suffer based on criminal action is the same as that stemming from a civil action, stockholders
should consider both forms of punishment acceptable. See id.
237. See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 9 (Autumn 1997) (explaining that a corporation can better
determine the burdens and benefits that will result from its actions).
238. See Edgerton, supra note 235, at 837.
239. See NSPE, supra note 7, at § I(1).
240. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3(a)(1) (2008) (allowing for the imposition of a
$1000 fine).
241. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(b) (West Supp. 2008) (providing for two to four
years of prison time).
242. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
243. See Coleman, supra note 199, at 925 (explaining that small fines can be seen as a
license fee allowing criminal conduct).
244. See supra Part I.B.1.
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